The wiretap channel models secure communication of two users in the presence of a non-legitimate eavesdropper who must be kept ignorant of transmitted messages. The performance of such a system is usually characterized by its secrecy capacity determining the maximum transmission rate of secure communication. In this paper, the issue of whether the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters or not is examined. In particular, this is done for channel uncertainty modeled via compound channels and arbitrarily varying channels, in which the legitimate users know only that the true channel realization is from a pre-specified uncertainty set. In the former model, this realization remains constant for the whole duration of transmission, while in the latter the realization varies from channel use to channel use in an unknown and arbitrary manner. These models not only capture the case of channel uncertainty, but are also suitable to model scenarios in which a malicious adversary influences or jams the legitimate transmission. The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel is shown to be robust in the sense that it is a continuous function of the uncertainty set. Thus, small variations in the uncertainty set lead to small variations in secrecy capacity. On the other hand, the deterministic secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel is shown to be discontinuous in the uncertainty set meaning that small variations can lead to dramatic losses in capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In current communication systems, there is usually an architectural separation between error correction and data encryption. The former is typically realized at the physical layer transforming the noisy communication channel into a reliable "bit pipe." The data encryption is implemented on top of that by applying cryptographic principles. A drawback of this approach is that it relies on the assumption of insufficient computational capabilities of non-legitimate receivers resulting in so-called conditional security.
Nowadays, information theoretic approaches to security are intensively discussed as a complement to such cryptographic techniques. Such approaches establish reliable communication and data confidentiality jointly at the physical layer by taking the properties of the noisy channel into account. This line of study was initiated by Wyner, who introduced the wiretap channel in [1] , and subsequently generalized by Csiszár and Körner to the broadcast channel with confidential messages [2] . Recently, this area of research has drawn considerable attention since it provides a promising approach to achieve unconditional security and to embed secure communication into wireless networks; see for example [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] and references therein. Not surprisingly, it therefore has also been identified by operators and national agencies as a key technique to secure future communication systems [9, 10] .
These studies are in particular crucial for wireless communication systems, since they are inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping due to the open nature of the wireless medium. Indeed, transmitted signals are received by intended users but are also easily eavesdropped upon by non-legitimate receivers. Many of the previous studies have in common that all channels (including those to the eavesdropper) are assumed to be perfectly known to all users and fixed during the entire duration of transmission. However, in practical systems channel state information (CSI) will always be limited due to the nature of the wireless channel and estimation/feedback inaccuracy. Furthermore, malevolent eavesdroppers will not provide any information about their channels to the legitimate users to make eavesdropping even harder. Accordingly, limited CSI (especially for the eavesdropper channel) must be assumed to ensure reliability and data confidentiality.
A first step in the direction of more realistic CSI assumptions is given by the concept of a compound channel [11, 12] . Here it is assumed that the actual channel realization is unknown. Rather, it is only known to the legitimate users that the true realization belongs to a known set of channels (uncertainty set) and that it remains constant during the whole duration of transmission. Accordingly, secure communication over compound channels is of great importance. The compound wiretap channel has been studied in [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] and the compound broadcast channel with confidential messages in [18, 19] . Despite these efforts, a general single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity remains unknown until now (if it exists at all).
Such a description is only known for special cases such as degraded channels [13, 14] or certain MIMO Gaussian channels [17] . For the general case, only a multi-letter description of the secrecy capacity has been established so far [14] .
The quality of CSI is further weakened by the concept of arbitrarily varying channels (AVCs) [20] [21] [22] .
In addition to the assumption that the actual channel realization is known only to be from a known uncertainty set, it is further assumed that this realization may vary from channel use to channel use in an arbitrary and unknown manner (in contrast to compound channels in which it remains constant).
The corresponding arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) has been studied in [23] [24] [25] [26] and it has been shown that it makes a difference whether deterministic or common randomness (CR) assisted codes are used. In particular, the deterministic secrecy capacity may be zero (if the channel possesses the socalled property of symmetrizability as precisely defined later), while the CR-assisted secrecy capacity is non-zero. In [24] a complete characterization of the relation between the deterministic and CR-assisted secrecy capacity is established; however, a characterization of the CR-assisted secrecy capacity itself remains open. Only under certain circumstances is a CR-assisted achievable secrecy rate known [24, 26] .
These concepts of compound and arbitrarily varying channels do not only capture the case of imperfect CSI, but are also suitable to model scenarios with active adversaries. For example, such an adversary may be able to maliciously influence the channel conditions by controlling which channel realization governs the transmission. Since legitimate transmitter and receiver have usually no knowledge about the strategy or the intention of the adversary, they have to choose their encoding-decoding functions in such a way that they work for all possible channel realizations simultaneously. Thus, such attacks can be perfectly modeled by compound channels. It becomes even worse for more powerful adversaries, which may be able to jam the legitimate transmission. Again, having no knowledge about the particular jamming September 17, 2014 DRAFT strategy, the legitimate users have to be prepared for a channel that may vary in an unknown and arbitrary manner from channel use to channel use. This is the AVWC, which has been analyzed in [25] in this context. In particular, the optimal jamming strategy of the adversary has been identified and it is shown that it differs whether the adversary has access to the common randomness or not.
The analysis in this paper is driven by the following observation: Obviously, the secrecy capacities of the compound wiretap channel and the AVWC depend on the underlying uncertainty set. Now in general, the performance of a communication system (in our case the secrecy capacity) should depend in a continuous way on the system parameters (in particular the uncertainty set). Since, if small changes in the parameters would lead to dramatic losses in performance, the approach at hand will most likely not be used. Indeed, one is interested in approaches that are robust against such variations in the sense that small variations in the uncertainty set result in small variations in the secrecy capacity. Such a continuous dependency is in particular desirable in the context of active adversaries who can influence the system parameters in a malicious way. Surprisingly, the question of continuity of capacities for classical communication scenarios is rarely discussed. However, for the quantum case, there has been some work. Continuity capacities has been studied in [27] for quantum channels and in [28] for arbitrarily varying quantum channels.
In Section II we introduce the compound wiretap channel and a distance concept to measure how "close" two compound wiretap channels are. Then in Section III, we show that the corresponding secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the uncertainty set. Thus, for compound channels, small variations in the uncertainty set result only in small variations of the secrecy capacity. Interpreting the uncertainty set as the strategy space of an adversary, this shows that secure communication over compound channels is robust against changes in the adversary's strategies.
In Section IV we introduce the AVWC and study its secrecy capacity in Section V. While the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel is continuous in the uncertainty set, we see that the unassisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC can be discontinuous in the uncertainty set. The practical relevance of this observation is that such unassisted schemes might not be robust in the sense that small variations can lead to dramatic losses in secrecy capacity. In particular in the context of active adversaries this means that small changes in the adversary's strategy can lead to completely different behavior of the system.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
DRAFT September 17, 2014 Fig. 1 . Compound wiretap channel. The transmitter encodes the message J into the codeword X n = E(J) and transmits it over the compound wiretap channel to the legitimate receiver, which has to decode its intended messageĴ = ϕ(Y n s ) for any channel realization s ∈ S. At the same time, the eavesdropper has to be kept ignorant of J in the sense that maxs∈S I(J; Z n s ) ≤ δn.
Notation
Discrete random variables are denoted by capital letters and their realizations and ranges by lower case and script letters, respectively; all logarithms and information quantities are taken to the base 2; N and R + are the sets of non-negative integers and non-negative real numbers; (0, 1) and [0, 1] are the open and closed intervals between 0 and 1; I(·; ·) is the mutual information and H(·) and H 2 (·) are the traditional entropy and binary entropy function; the notation H(· P XY ) and I(·; · P XY ) means that the entropy and mutual information are evaluated according to the underlying probability distribution P XY ; X − Y − Z denotes a Markov chain of random variables X, Y , and Z in this order; P{·} is the probability of an event and P(X ) denotes the set of all probability distributions on X and E X [·] is the expectation with respect to X; P X − Q X is the total variation distance of probability distributions P X and Q X on X defined as P X − Q X := x∈X |P X (x) − Q X (x)|; a positive null sequence {a n } n∈N is a sequence which satisfies a n 0 as n → ∞; lhs := rhs means the value of the right hand side (rhs) is assigned to the left hand side (lhs), lhs =: rhs is defined accordingly.
II. COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNELS
We begin with the compound wiretap channel in which the actual channel realization is unknown to the legitimate users. It is known only that it is constant during the whole duration of transmission and lies in a known uncertainty set. In particular, this models scenarios in which an adversary influences the channel conditions by choosing the actual realization unknown to the legitimate users. The compound wiretap channel is depicted in Fig. 1 .
The main result will be that the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel is continuous in the uncertainty set. The consequence is that the presented approach for secure communication over compound channels is robust against such classes of attacks.
Let X , Y, and Z be finite input and output sets and S be an arbitrary state set. Then for given state s ∈ S and input and output sequences x n ∈ X n , y n ∈ Y n , and z n ∈ Z n of length n, the discrete memoryless channels to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are given by W n s (y n |x n ) :
. Then the (marginal) compound channel to the legitimate receiver is defined by the family of channels for all s ∈ S as
Similarly, we define the compound channel to the eavesdropper as V := {V s } s∈S .
Definition 1. The discrete memoryless compound wiretap channel is given by the families of pairs of compound channels with common input as
Remark 1. Throughout the paper we will also refer to W as the uncertainty set of the compound wiretap channel. Later in Section III-A we will clarify why it is reasonable to define the uncertainty by the channel matrices ({W s } s∈S , {V s } s∈S ) and not by the state set S itself.
A. Codes for Compound Wiretap Channels
We consider a block code of arbitrary but fixed length n. Let J n := {1, ..., J n } be the set of confidential messages.
Definition 2. An (n, J n )-code C consists of a stochastic encoder
and a deterministic decoder at the legitimate receiver
The encoder E in (1) is allowed to be stochastic. This means that it is specified by conditional probabilities E(x n |j) with x n ∈X n E(x n |j) = 1 for each j ∈ J n , where E(x n |j) denotes the probability that the transmitter encodes the message j ∈ J n as x n ∈ X n .
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Remark 2. For the compound wiretap channel it suffices to consider codes as defined in Definition 2.
However, we will see that for the following AVWC in Section IV we need more sophisticated code concepts based on common randomness (CR); so-called CR-assisted codes, cf. Definition 8. In this context, we will then refer to codes of Definition 2 as unassisted codes.
Remark 3. Since the true channel realization is unknown to the transmitter and receiver, encoder (1) and decoder (2) must be universal in the sense that they do not depend on the particular state s ∈ S.
When the transmitter has sent the message j ∈ J n and the legitimate receiver has received y n ∈ Y n , its decoder is in error if ϕ(y n ) = j. Then for an (n, J n )-code C, the average probability of error for channel realization s ∈ S is given bȳ
To ensure the confidentiality of the message for all channel realizations s ∈ S, we require max s∈S I(J; Z n s C) ≤ δ n for some (small) δ n > 0 with J the random variable uniformly distributed over the set of messages J n and Z n s = (Z s,1 , Z s,2 , ..., Z s,n ) the output at the eavesdropper for channel realization s ∈ S. This criterion is known as strong secrecy [29, 30] and the motivation behind this is to control the total amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper. This yields the following definition.
Remark 4.
Conditioning on the code C in I(J; Z n s C) indicates that the mutual information term is evaluated under this particular kind of code, i.e., the underlying joint probability distribution is given by
since the messages are assumed to be uniformly distributed. Note that for the compound wiretap channel, this notation is dispensable since we only deal with one class of codes, cf. Definition 2. The notation becomes crucial for AVWCs, where different code concepts are used.
Definition 3.
A rate R > 0 is said to be an achievable secrecy rate for the compound wiretap channel if for any τ > 0 there exist an n(τ ) ∈ N, positive null sequences {λ n } n∈N , {δ n } n∈N , and a sequence of (n, J n )-codes {C n } n∈N such that for all n ≥ n(τ ) we have The secrecy capacity C S (W) of the compound wiretap channel with uncertainty set W is given by the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates R.
Note that the supremum in Definition 3 can be replaced by the maximum.
B. Capacity Results
The compound wiretap channel has been studied under several aspects. In [13, Theorem 1] an achievable secrecy rate for finite uncertainty sets and the weak secrecy criterion is established. The result has been strengthened in [14] and [17] to hold also for strong secrecy and arbitrary (not necessarily finite or countable) uncertainty sets.
Proposition 1 ([13]
). The secrecy capacity C S (W) of the compound wiretap channel with uncertainty set W is lower-bounded by
for random variables U − X − (Y s , Z s ) forming a Markov chain with Y s and Z s the random variables associated with the outputs of the channels W s and V s , s ∈ S.
For degraded channels (where each realization of the eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of each realization of the legitimate channel) it has been shown in [13, Theorem 3] that the secrecy rate in Proposition 1 is actually the secrecy capacity with the choice U = X in (3).
Although a single-letter expression of the secrecy capacity that holds in the general, non-degraded, case is still unknown, a multi-letter description was established in [14, Remark 2] .
Theorem 1 ([14]
). The secrecy capacity C S (W) of the compound wiretap channel with uncertainty set W is
for random variables U − X n − (Y n s , Z n s ) forming a Markov chain.
Remark 5. Note that the limit in (4) exists and is well defined, cf. [14, Lemma 5] .
In the next section we want to use the multi-letter expression (4) in Theorem 1 to analyze the dependency of the secrecy capacity on the uncertainty set.
DRAFTIII. CONTINUITY OF COMPOUND SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section, we analyze the secrecy capacity C S (W) of the compound wiretap channel and show that it is a continuous function of the uncertainty set W. For this purpose, we need a concept to measure the distance between two compound wiretap channels as introduced in the following.
A. Distance between Compound Wiretap Channels
Let (W, V ) and ( W , V ) be two wiretap channels (with finite input and output alphabets X , Y, and Z). We define the distance between two (marginal) channels based on the total variation distance 1 as
and between the corresponding wiretap channels as
Next, we extend this concept to the compound case. Accordingly, let W 1 = (W 1 , V 1 ) and W 2 = (W 2 , V 2 ) with index sets S 1 and S 2 be two uncertainty sets for compound wiretap channels with marginal compound channels W i = {W si } si∈Si and V i = {V si } si∈Si , i = 1, 2. We define distances between the legitimate compound channels as
and between the eavesdropper compound channels as
between two compound wiretap channels with uncertainty sets
The distance D(W 1 , W 2 ) between two compound wiretap channels with uncertainty sets W 1 and W 2 characterizes how "close" or similar these two compound wiretap channels are. Accordingly, it can also be interpreted as a measure of how well one compound wiretap channel can be approximated by another one.
Further, this definition has the following implications. Let W be an uncertainty set with state set S and further let {W n } n∈N be a sequence with {S n } n∈N which satisfy
Then there exists for every channel realization (Wŝ, Vŝ) from the uncertainty set W = {W, V} with state set S a sequence {ŝ n } n∈N withŝ n ∈Ŝ n and
Moreover, for every > 0 there exists an n 0 = n 0 ( ) such that for all n ≥ n 0 and all (Wŝ, Vŝ) ∈ W n there exists a channel realization (Ws, Vs) ∈ W such that max x∈X y∈Y
Finally, we want to illustrate this concept of distance between channels with the help of a small example. Therefore, let Y = {y 1 , y 2 , y 3 }, X = {x 1 , x 2 }, and S = {s 1 , s 2 } with |Y| = 3, |X | = 2, and |S| = 2 respectively. Having two possible states, the (single-user) compound channel W 1 = {W s1 , W s2 } consists of two possible channel realizations W s1 and W s2 . Such a compound channel is visualized in 
Fig . 2 . Output probability distributions visualized in the Y-plane. The corner points correspond to the stochastic matrices with
The shaded areas are -regions where all stochastic matrices are close to a specific stochastic matrix according to (5) . Note that the form of these regions depend on the applied norm.
to W 1 in the sense that D(W 1 , W 2 ) < , cf. (6), then the following conditions must be satisfied: This discussion shows the necessity of defining the distance between compound channels in terms of {W s } s∈S and { W s } s∈ S and not by the state sets S and S themselves. Obviously, with the former definition, two compound channels can be "close" in their uncertainty sets although their state sets may differ a lot. For example, in the previous discussion, the constructed state set S could consist of infinitely many elements which is quite different to the original set S which consists of only two elements.
B. Continuity of Compound Secrecy Capacity
Now we want to study what happens if there are small variations in the uncertainty set. Obviously, it is desirable to have a continuous behavior of the secrecy capacity meaning that small variations in the uncertainty set should only lead to small variations in the corresponding secrecy capacity. For the analysis, we need two important lemmas. Similar results were first stated and proved in [31] and [27] in the context of quantum information theory. In this paper, we consider classical probability distributions only which allow us to obtain similar results with better constants. Lemma 1. Let X and Y be finite alphabets and ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary. Then for all joint probability distributions P XY , Q XY ∈ P(X × Y) with P XY − Q XY ≤ it holds that
with δ 1 ( , |Y|) := 2 log |Y| + 2H 2 ( ). Here, H(Y |X P XY ) denotes the conditional entropy of Y given X when X and Y are distributed according to the joint probability distribution P XY ∈ P(X × Y).
Proof:
The proof is an adaptation of the corresponding proof in [31] for quantum sources.
However, restricting ourselves to classical probability distributions allow us to obtain better constants.
For completeness, the proof can be found in Appendix A.
Note that the right hand side of (7) depends only on the size of the alphabet Y, but it is independent of X . This observation will be crucial for the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 2. Let X and Y be finite alphabets and W, W : X → P(Y) be arbitrary channels with
for some > 0. For arbitrary n ∈ N, let U be an arbitrary finite set, P U ∈ P(U) the uniform distribution on U, and E(x n |u), x n ∈ X n an arbitrary stochastic encoder, cf. (1). We consider the probability distributions
Then it holds that
with δ 2 ( , |Y|) := 4 log |Y| + 4H 2 ( ).
The proof is an adaptation of the proof in [27] for quantum capacities. Considering classical probability distributions allow proving results with better constants. For completeness, the proof can be found in Appendix B.
Note that inequality (9) depends only on the size of the output alphabet Y, but is independent of the size of U and the chosen stochastic encoder. 
then it holds that
with δ( , |Y|, |Z|) := 4 log |Y||Z| + 8H 2 ( ) a constant depending on the distance and the output alphabet sizes |Y| and |Z|.
Proof: Let ξ > 0 be arbitrary but fixed. There exists anŝ 1 =ŝ 1 (ξ) such that
By assumption, there exists also anŝ 2 =ŝ 2 (ŝ 1 ) such that
This implies
by Lemma 2, cf. (9) . With this we obtain
Note that relation (11) holds for all ξ > 0. Since, the left hand side does not depend on δ, we obtain
We observe that if we exchange the roles of S 1 and S 2 in the previous derivation, we end up with an expression as in (12) , where infima over S 1 and S 2 are switched. Accordingly, this means that
The same arguments lead to
so that we conclude
with δ( , |Y|, |Z|) = 4 log |Y||Z| + 8H 2 ( ). But this implies for the secrecy capacities
so that
Again, we can exchange the roles of S 1 and S 2 in the derivation above to obtain a relation as in (13) where C S (W 1 ) and C S (W 2 ) are switched. Thus, we have
which proves the desired result.
Corollary 1. For any compound wiretap channel with uncertainty set W and any sequence {W n } n∈N
Proof: The result follows immediately from (10) of Theorem 2.
C. Discussion
In this section we have shown that the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel is a continuous function of the uncertainty set. This means that small variations in the uncertainty set result only in small variations of the corresponding secrecy capacity. This is in particular crucial in the context of adversaries, DRAFT September 17, 2014 Fig. 3 . Arbitrarily varying wiretap channel. In contrast to the compound wiretap channel, the transmission is now governed by an unknown state sequence s n ∈ S n of length n, which may vary in an unknown manner from channel use to channel use.
where the uncertainty set reflects the adversary's strategy space. It is a necessary requirement for a system design to be robust, i.e., having continuous dependency, against such changes in strategies.
Finally, we want to highlight that the continuity of the secrecy capacity was established without having a single-letter description available. Although a multi-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity as given in Theorem 1 is not efficiently computable, it is extremely useful to derive certain properties such as continuity as demonstrated in Theorem 2.
IV. ARBITRARILY VARYING WIRETAP CHANNEL
We continue our analysis with the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel. In contrast to the previously studied compound wiretap channel, the unknown channel realization may vary in an unknown and arbitrary manner from channel use to channel use. This includes the scenario of active adversaries, who are able to jam the legitimate transmission. The arbitrarily varying wiretap channel is depicted in Fig. 3 .
The main result for the AVWC will be that its unassisted secrecy capacity is a discontinuous function of the uncertainty set. Accordingly, unassisted strategies will not be robust against such classes of attacks.
In particular, we will show that even for the simplest case of an uncertainty set with only two states, the corresponding unassisted secrecy capacity will be discontinuous in the uncertainty set. Obviously, this is then also true for more general AVWCs, whose uncertainty sets contain more elements. Note that the case of an uncertainty set with one element does not define an AVWC (since the channel realization naturally stays constant for the whole duration of transmission), but belongs to compound wiretap channels, whose secrecy capacity is continuous.
As for the compound wiretap channel in Section II let X , Y, and Z be finite input and output sets and S be a finite state set. Then for a fixed state sequence s n ∈ S n of length n, the discrete memoryless channel to the legitimate receiver is given by W n s n (y n |x n ) = W n (y n |x n , s n ) := n i=1 W (y i |x i , s i ). Then the family of channels for all s n ∈ S n defines the (marginal) AVC to the legitimate receiver as
In addition, for any probability distribution q ∈ P(S) we define the averaged channel as
An important property of an AVC is the so-called concept of symmetrizability as defined below.
Definition 5. An AVC is called symmetrizable if there exists a stochastic matrix σ : X → P(S) such
holds for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ X and y ∈ Y.
Roughly speaking, a symmetrizable AVC can "simulate" a valid input, which makes it impossible for the decoder to decide on the correct codeword.
Similarly for the channel to the eavesdropper, we define the discrete memoryless channel as
for given state sequence s n ∈ S n . Further, we set V := {V n s n } s n ∈S n and V q (z|x) = s∈S V (z|x, s)q(s) for q ∈ P(S).
Definition 6. The discrete memoryless arbitrarily varying wiretap channel is given by the families of pairs of channels with common input
A. Unassisted Codes
The definition of an unassisted (n, J n )-code C for the AVWC is the same as for the compound wiretap channel in Definition 2: It consists of a stochastic encoder as in (1) and a deterministic decoder as in (2).
The difference lies in the reliability and secrecy criteria as we have now to consider state sequences s n ∈ S n of length n. Thus, for given s n ∈ S n the average probability of decoding error at the legitimate receiver isē
and the confidentiality of the message is measured by max s n ∈S n I(J; Z n s n C) ≤ δ n with Z n s n = (Z s1 , Z s2 , ..., Z sn ).
Definition 7.
A rate R > 0 is said to be an achievable secrecy rate for the AVWC if for any τ > 0 there exist an n(τ ) ∈ N, positive null sequences {λ n } n∈N , {δ n } n∈N , and a sequence of (n, J n )-codes {C n } n∈N such that for all n ≥ n(τ ) we have
and
The unassisted secrecy capacity C S (W) of the AVWC with uncertainty set W is given by the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates R.
Remark 6. Conditions (15) and (16) already indicate that an active adversary may have different strategies.
On the one hand, it can try to disturb the legitimate communication as much as possible by choosing the state sequence in such a way that the probability of error (15) is maximized. On the other hand, it can try to maximize the information leakage (16) . Of course, any strategy in between is also a valid jamming strategy.
Unfortunately, such unassisted approaches do not suffice to establish reliable communication over symmetrizable AVCs, cf. Definition 5; indeed, the corresponding capacity is zero in this case [22, 24, 25] .
This necessitates the use of more sophisticated strategies based on common randomness.
B. CR-Assisted Codes
CR is modeled by a random variable Γ taking values in a finite set G n according to a distribution P Γ ∈ P(G n ). It enables transmitter and receiver to coordinate their choice of encoder (1) and decoder (2) according to the realization γ ∈ G n .
Definition 8.
A CR-assisted (n, J n , G n , P Γ )-code C CR is given by a family of unassisted codes
together with a random variable Γ taking values in G n with |G n | < ∞ according to P Γ ∈ P(G n ).
The reliability and secrecy constraints from above extend to CR-assisted codes in the following way:
The mean average probability of error for s n ∈ S n is given byē CR,n (s n C CR ) = E Γ [ē n (s n C(Γ ))], i.e., e CR,n (s n C CR ) := 1 |J n | j∈Jn γ∈Gn x n ∈X n y n :ϕγ (y n ) =j
With I(J; Z n s n C CR ) = E Γ [I(J; Z n s n C(Γ ))] the secrecy requirement becomes
The definitions of a CR-assisted achievable secrecy rate and the CR-assisted secrecy capacity C S,CR (W)
follow accordingly.
C. Capacity Results
Studies have been done in order to understand the secrecy capacity of the AVWC [23] [24] [25] where the latter use the strong secrecy criterion. In particular, the relation between the secrecy capacities for unassisted and CR-assisted codes has been completely characterized in [24, Theorem 2]. Only for the special case of a best channel to the eavesdropper is an achievable secrecy rate known.
Theorem 3 ([24]). If the CR-assisted secrecy capacity satisfies C S,CR (W)
A channel V q * ∈ {V q : q ∈ P(S)} such that all other channels from this set are degraded versions of V q * is called best channel to the eavesdropper, i.e., V q * is a best channel if
holds with Z q the random variable associated with the output of the averaged channel V q , q ∈ P(S). with Y q and Z q the random variables associated with the outputs of the averaged channels W q and V q , q ∈ P(S).
In [26] it is further shown that Theorem 4 holds in general for the secrecy measure of average decoding error at the eavesdropper (instead of strong secrecy).
Remark 7.
For the single-user AVC W it has been shown in [20] that the CR-assisted capacity C CR (W) equals the unassisted capacity C(W) of the compound channel W constructed from its averaged channels, cf. (14) . The unassisted capacity C(W) of W displays the same behavior as the secrecy capacity in Theorem 3: C(W) is either zero or equals C CR (W) [21, 22] . Since C CR (W) = C(W), we have
which is also known as Ahlswede's dichotomy. It shows that the AVC and compound channel are strongly connected. The results for the AVWC indicate a similar connection between the AVWC and the compound wiretap channel. However, as the CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC is still unknown, it remains to completely characterize and establish this connection.
V. DISCONTINUITY OF AVWC SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section want to study the continuity of the unassisted secrecy capacity C S (W) of the AVWC with uncertainty set W. Theorem 3 provides only a characterization in terms of its corresponding CRassisted secrecy capacity C S,CR (W), but unfortunately, there is no explicit characterization known in terms of entropic quantities. Therefore, the analysis becomes much more complicated and involved compared to the compound wiretap channel in Section II where such a (multi-letter) characterization is known.
Nonetheless, we will be able to show that the unassisted secrecy capacity C S (W) is discontinuous in the uncertainty set W. Similar to the compound wiretap channel, we ask the question: if the distance between two AVWCs is small, i.e., D(W 1 , W 2 ) < , does this imply that
as well?
In more detail, let {W n } n∈N be a sequence of finite uncertainty sets, who converge to a finite set W * in terms of D-distance. The question is then whether or not this implies
In the following we want to analyze this via a simple example to show that (17) does not hold in general.
A. Secrecy Capacity with Discontinuity Point
The aim of this part is to construct an AVWC whose unassisted secrecy capacity has a discontinuity point. To do so, we consider a communication scenario with input and output alphabets of sizes |X | = 2, |Y| = 3, |Z| = 2, and |S| = 2.
Let us first consider the communication channel to the legitimate receiver. To construct a suitable AVC for this link, we make use of an example which first appeared in [20] and which was later also discussed in [21, Example 1]. We follow this example and construct an AVC to the legitimate receiver with uncertainty set
where We know from [21] that W then defines a symmetrizable AVC so that its unassisted capacity is zero,
i.e., C(W) = 0. 
we define the trivial AVC whose two elements are identical aŝ
Now, for the channel to the eavesdropper, we define the "useless" channel
Then the set V = {V, V } defines a corresponding AVC to the eavesdropper.
These definitions finally create with (18), (20) , and (21) the following two AVWCs specified by their uncertainty sets
Moreover, we can define a convex combination of these two AVWCs as
with convex combinations
Note that (22) is indeed a convex combination of the eavesdropper AVC as well which is trivial in this case as we have identical elements.
Now, the following result shows that the unassisted secrecy capacity C S (W(λ)) is discontinuous in λ. 
2) The unassisted secrecy capacity C S (W(λ)) is continuous in λ for all λ ∈ (0, 1]. It holds that C S (W(0)) = 0 and further that
i.e., λ = 0 is a discontinuity point of C S (·).
Proof: Let us first give an outline of the proof which is divided in several steps. First, we will show that the AVC W(λ) = {W 1 (λ), W 2 (λ)} is non-symmetrizable for all λ ∈ (0, 1]. This implies then that
by Theorem 3. As a second step, we will then show that C S,CR (W(λ)) is continuous for all λ ∈ [0, 1]
and further
On the other hand, since W = {W 1 , W 2 } is symmetrizable, we have
But due to (27) , C S (W(λ)) is discontinuous in λ = 0. This will then conclude the proof.
Before we start proving the first step, we define suitable channels given by matrices
Similarly as in (23), we define convex combinations of these vectors with the rows ofŴ in (19) . In more detail, for each λ ∈ (0, 1) we have
Now we are in the position to show the first step as outlined above. Therefore, we first show by contradiction that the AVC W(λ) = {W 1 (λ), W 2 (λ)} = {W s,λ } s=1,2 is non-symmetrizable for all λ ∈ (0, 1]. Accordingly, we assume that this channel is symmetrizable, i.e., for each λ ∈ (0, 1] there exists a stochastic matrix σ : X → P(S) with
for all y ∈ {1, 2, 3} and x 1 , x 2 ∈ {1, 2}, cf. Definition 5. With s ∈ {1, 2} this would imply 
In particular, the second line is
non-symmetrizable and therewith
Next, we prove the second step, where we want to understand the behavior of the CR-assisted secrecy
To do so, we look at the corresponding CR-assisted capacity of the legitimate link (no secrecy at this point). For any q ∈ P(S), let
be the averaged channel as in (14) . Then we know from results for the classical AVC, cf. [20] [21] [22] , that
since P(X ) and P(S) are convex sets and the mutual information I is concave in p and convex in W q,λ .
Moreover, (28) is continuous in λ ∈ [0, 1].
Assume that there exists an λ 0 ∈ [0, 1] with
then there must be a q 0 ∈ P(S) such that
This would imply for the matrix
that both of its rows are equal, i.e., its output distribution does not depend on the particular input x = 1 or x = 2. And this means that
This implies that
must hold, i.e.,
For λ 0 ∈ (0, 1], again, this would imply q 0 > 1 which is impossible. For λ 0 = 0 on the other hand, we get q 0 = 1 so that the channel is simply given by the matrix W 2 . But this is also not possible, since the rows are not the same. Thus, for all λ ∈ [0, 1] we have
Since the function is continuous in λ, we have
It remains to show that
holds. Obviously, the inequality C S,CR (W(λ)) ≤ C CR (W(λ)) holds so that we only have to show the other direction. Therefore, let R > 0 be a CR-assisted achievable rate for non-secret communication,
i.e., for each τ > 0 there exists an n(τ ) ∈ N and a sequence of (n, J n , G n , P Γ )-codes C CR such that for all n ≥ n(τ ) we have 1 n log |J n | ≥ R − τ and max s n ∈S nē n (s n C CR ) → 0 as n → ∞. Now we have to analyze the secrecy condition I(J; Z n s n C CR ) for this code. The corresponding joint probability distribution is given by
Since we only have one possible channel realization V , cf. (21) , in this particular example, we have V (z|x, s) = V (z|x). Moreover, since V is the "useless" channel, the output z n in n i=1 V (z i |x i )) is independent of the input x n so that I(J; Z n s n C CR ) = 0. We conclude that this rate then is also achievable under the strong secrecy criterion which then shows C S,CR (W(λ)) = C CR (W(λ)) so that (24) and therewith assertion 1) of the theorem is proved.
Finally, we complete the proof for assertion 2) of theorem. Since the AVC W(λ) for λ ∈ (0, 1] is non-symmetrizable so that C S,CR (W(λ)) = C CR (W(λ)), we also have
But since for λ = 0 the AVC W(λ) is symmetrizable, we must have
and therewith
i.e., C S (·) is a discontinuous function which proves (25) and therewith the assertion 2) of the theorem.
Remark 8. Note that Theorem 5 is proven for the strong secrecy criterion. However, it also holds for the weak secrecy criterion, which means that weakening the secrecy requirement does not help to overcome the discontinuity problem.
An interesting observation appears when we analyze the previous result in the context of the different jamming strategies of the adversary, cf. Remark 6. Obviously, the adversary is not able to choose a state sequence that will provide any information leakage to him, i.e., that security criterion cannot be attacked. Accordingly, the strategy will be to choose the state sequence in such a way that the legitimate communication is disturbed as much as possible. Now for the case λ = 0 in Theorem 5 we see the following: Whenever the legitimate users try to communicate at a positive rate, the adversary can jam the communication such that the decoding error at the legitimate receiver is always greater than 1/4 since the W is symmetrizable (see also [25] for more detailed discussion). Thus, no reliable communication is possible.
On the other hand, for λ > 0 we have C S (W(λ)) > 0 so that in this case reliable and secure communication is possible. However, from this we cannot conclude on C S (W(0)) by taking the limit λ → 0, since λ = 0 is a discontinuous point. Thus, it is not robust since small variations can result in a dramatic loss in secrecy capacity.
B. Set of Non-Symmetrizable AVWCs
Here we want to show that it is possible to have a whole set of AVWCs whose unassisted secrecy capacities are non-zero.
For this purpose, we consider channels σ, σ : X → P(S), and an AVC given by the uncertainty set W. We define the function
with W σ (y|x 1 , x 2 ) = s∈S W (y|x 1 , s)σ(s|x 2 ). Then F is a continuous function of σ, σ , and W. Letσ andσ be channels such that F (σ,σ , W) = 0. Then it also holds
for all y ∈ Y and x 1 , x 2 ∈ X . We can interchange the elements x 2 and x 1 to obtain
for all y ∈ Y and x 1 , x 2 ∈ X as well. Now, with
we obtain
which shows that the AVC W is symmetrizable proving the lemma.
Lemma 4. Let W 1 be an AVC with state set S 1 and
Then there exists an > 0 such that for all finite AVCsŴ 2 with state set S 2 and D(
which means that these AVCs are also non-symmetrizable.
Proof: For every s 2 ∈ S 2 there exists anŝ 1 =ŝ 1 (s 2 ) such that
Accordingly, we get
Now, we define the channelsσ,σ : X → P(S 1 ) as follows: For fixed s 1 ∈ S 1 let I(s 1 ) be the set of all
Similarly, we define the channelσ . Then left hand side of (29) is equal to
and therewith greater than δ per definition. Thus, we get
Finally, we set < δ 4 to complete the proof, since the right hand side of (30) is independent of σ and σ so that we can equivalently choose the minimum.
With these lemmas we are in the position to prove the following result which shows that there are sets of AVWCs that all have a non-zero unassisted secrecy capacity. 
C. Set of Symmetrizable AVWCs
In Section V-A it was shown that the unassisted secrecy capacity of an AVWC can have a discontinuity point. Thus, symmetrizable AVWCs can appear as a discontinuity point within sets of non-symmetrizable AVWCs. Here, we want to show that it is also possible that there are whole sets of symmetrizable AVWCs.
To do so, we construct an example of an AVWC W * for which a whole set of AVWCs W around this channel W * , we always have C S,CR (W) > 0 and C S (W) = C S (W * ) = 0. Therefore, we define the AVC to the legitimate receiver by the uncertainty set W * = {W For the AVC to the eavesdropper we choose again V = {V, V } with V as in (21) . With this choice, the channel to the eavesdropper remains fixed, while for the channel to the legitimate receiver we allow appropriate variations. The corresponding AVWC W * is then W * = {W * , V}.
Further, we define the channel σ * : X → P(S) as
Then a simple calculation shows immediately that
holds for all y ∈ Y, which means that the AVC W * is symmetrizable so that C S (W * ) = 0 by Theorem 3. Now, the following theorem shows that there exists a whole set around this AVWC which has zero secrecy capacity as well. Proof: Due to Theorem 5 it suffices to concentrate on the AVC W to the legitimate receiver. Due to the choice of V , cf. (21), for all AVWCs W we have
and Surprisingly, the answer to the question of whether the secrecy is continuous or not depends highly on the abilities of the adversary -even for the simplest case of an uncertainty set containing two elements. If the actual realization from this uncertainty set remains constant for the whole duration of the transmission, the scenario at hand is the compound wiretap channel and the corresponding secrecy capacity is a continuous function of this uncertainty set. However, if the adversary is allowed to vary in unknown and arbitrary manner between these two realizations during the transmission, the legitimate users have to deal with an AVWC and its unassisted secrecy capacity can be discontinuous in the uncertainty set. We believe that more sophisticated strategies based on common randomness can help to overcome this discontinuity problem. Our conjecture is that the corresponding CR-assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC is a continuous function of the uncertainty set. and Dr. R. Plaga, BSI, for motivating and fruitful discussions that lead to these results.
APPENDIX
Here we present the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2. They are adaptations of [31] and [27] where similar results were proved in the context of quantum information theory. Restricting the analysis to classical probability distributions allow to obtain bounds with better constants.
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of the lemma follows [31] where a similar result is presented in the context of quantum information. However, in contrast to the quantum version in [31] we are able to get a better constant by using the fact that H(Y |X P XY ) ≥ 0 for all P XY ∈ P(X × Y).
Let P XY , Q XY ∈ P(X × Y) with P XY − Q XY ≤ . We assume that x∈X y∈Y
is satisfied with equality since otherwise we could replace in (33) with a smaller˜ < accordingly.
We define
and set
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y so that p * ∈ P(X , Y) is a joint probability distribution on X × Y.
Further, we setp
We have to check thatp andq are well defined in the sense that they are probability distributions.
p(x, y) ≥ 0 for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y is obviously true. It remains to check thatq(x, y) ≥ 0 for all so thatp ∈ P(X × Y) andq ∈ P(X × Y) are joint probability distributions.
With this we can express p * as
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y. Next, we show that (36a) implies
To do so, we use the fact that the conditioned entropy is concave, i.e., ≤ 2 log |Y| + 2H 2 ( ) which is (7) proving the lemma.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Let 0 ≤ k ≤ n arbitrary. We define
W (y l |x l )E(x n |u)P U (u).
Then it holds that P
U Y n = P U Y n and P 
For all 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 it holds that
We want to analyze right hand side of (41) in more detail. We present the analysis for the second expression, then the other one follows by the same arguments. For 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 we have u∈U y n ∈Y n P (k+1) U Y n (u, y n ) − P × W (y k+1 |x k+1 ) − W (y k+1 |x k+1 ) E(x n |u)P U (u) = u∈U x n ∈X n yk+1∈Y W (y k+1 |x k+1 ) − W (y k+1 |x k+1 ) × E(x n |u)P U (u) < · u∈U x n ∈X n E(x n |u)P U (u) =
where (42) follows from the fact that the distance between W and W is small by assumption, cf. (8).
Thus, (42) shows that the total variation between the joint probability distributions P as the sequence without the k-th element. In the following we study the random variables (U, Y n −(k+1) ) which are distributed according to P (k+1) U Y n , i.e., they have the probability distribution W (y l |x l )E(x n |u)P U (u).
Similarly, we look at the random variables (U, Y n −(k+1) ) which are distributed according to P 
where the first step follows from (43) and the last step from Lemma 1 and (42). Similarly, using the same ideas one can easily show that
holds as well.
Now, inserting (44) and (45) into (41), we obtain
so that the expression in (40) becomes
which proves the lemma.
